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General  competitive  analysis is extended  to  cover  a  dynamic,  pure-
exchange  econo,ny  with privately observed  shocks  to preferences.  In 
the  linear,  infinite-dimensional  space  containing  lotteries we  estab-
lish  the  existence  of  optima,  the  existence  of  competitive  equilibria, 
that every competitive  equilibrium is an  optimum,  and,  with  some 
revealing qualifications,  that every  optimum  can  be  supported  as  a 
competitive  equilibrium.  An  example  illustrates  that  rationing  and 
securities with  contrived  risk have  an  equilibrium interpretation. 1.  Introduction 
The  last decade  has  witnessed  a  virtual  explosion in  the  economics  of pri-
vate  information and  moral  hazard.  We  have  for  example  a  literature on  optimal 
contracts,  principal-agent relationships,  and  auctions  which  seeks  to  explain or 
evaluate  observed  arrangements  and  a  literature on  signaling and  adverse 
selection in competitive  insurance  markets  which  uncovers  various  existence  and 
welfare  anomalies.  11  There  is  no  doubt  now  that private  information has  had 
and will  continue  to  have  important  implications  for  positive  and  normative  re-
search. 
Yet,  despite  these  advances,  or  perhaps  because  of  them,  we  believe  more 
research is  needed  in relating  the above-mentioned  literatures to  constructs 
with  which  economists  are already  familiar.  In principal  the  gains  from  such 
research  can  be  multiple.  To  the  extent  that  a  standard construct  turns  out 
to  be  inapplicable when  private  information  is  introduced into an  otherwise 
standard  environment,  the  economic  nature  of private information,  and  the 
difficulties caused by  it, might  be  better understood.  Such  an  outcome  would 
be  consistent with  the  above-mentioned  literature which  uncovers  various  exis-
tence  and welfare anomalies.  At  the  same  time  there  remains  the  possibility that 
a  standard construct might  be  modified with  the  introduction of private  informa-
tion in  such  a  way  as  to  create a  construct  which  combines  the  explanatory power 
cf the  standard construct with  the  explanatory  power  of private  information. 
Such  a  construct might  also have  important  normative  implications. 
Some  research along  these  lines has  been  undertaken.  Independently,  both 
Myerson  [1979]  and Harris  and  Townsend  [1977][1981]  have  shown  that  standard 
11  No  attempt  can  be  made  here  to  survey  these literatures;  interested readers 
are  referred to Hirshliefer and  Riley  [1979]. -2-
concepts  of feasibility and  optimality are  inapplicable  in games  or  environments 
with  private information.  That  is,  following  the  Arrow  [1953]  and  Debreu  [1959] 
treatment  of uncertainty,  one  may  well  index allocations  by  the  realizations of 
random variables.  But  if these  random  variables  are privately observed  shocks 
or  parameters,  then  not all shock-contingent allocations are achievable.  It is 
~  if shock-contingent allocations  must  be  such  that  each  agent has  an  incentive 
to  correctly reveal his  own  privately-observed  shock.  It turns out,  though,  that 
the  conditions  which  give  each  agent  just  such  an  incentive,  which  Hurwicz  [1971] 
labeled  the  incentive  compatibility conditions,  are  frequently  both  necessary  and 
sufficient conditions  for  achievability.  That  is,  in  environments with  private in-
formation,  it may  be  enough  to  append  these  conditions  onto  the  standard definitions 
of feasibility  and  optimality,  and  go  on  to  characterize  (private  information)  opti-
mal  allocations  in  the  usual  way.  We  would  like  to  emphasize  here  the  success  of 
this  and  related  techniques  in various  recent applications:  Chari  (1980),  Green 
(1980)  and  Grossman  and  Hart  [1980]  explain underemployment;  Chiang  and  Spatt 
[1980]  explain observations  in industrial organization;  Morton  [1980]  explains 
strike duration;  and  Baron  and  Myerson  [1979],  Earris  and  Raviv  [1979],  [1980], 
and  Myerson  [1980]  examine  auction design  and  monopoly  pricing  schemes.  11 
In addition  to  extending  the  analysis  of private-information optima,  the 
purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  begin an  exploration of  the  applicability of general 
equilibrium competitive analysis,  another  standard construct,  to  economies  with 
a  large  number  of agents  and private  information.  On  the  face  of it, this under-
taking would  seem  to  be  difficult;  the  incentive compatibility conditions  in-
crease more  than proportionately with  an  increase in  the  number  of agents. 
11  Some  of this  recent  literature postdates  an earlier draft of this  paper.  We 
cite it here  to  make  the  case  that  standard constructs  modified  to  allow  for  pri-
vate  information have  indeed  proved  successful  and  in all likelihood will  con-
tinue  to  be  so. -3-
Moreover  such  conditions  can  introduce  nonconvexities,  whereas  in competitive 
analysis,  convexity is usually  assumed  ~ priori.  Here  we  handle  the  first 
problem by  consideration of large  economies  in which  the distribution of un-
observed  shocks  in the population is  the  same  as  the  probability distribution 
of shocks  for  each  individual,  and  by  treating agents  with  the  same  shock in  the 
same  way.  We  handle  the  second  problem by  following  von  Neumann  and  Mortenstern's 
[1947]  seminal  contribution,  using  lotteries  to make  spaces  convex.  Then,  making 
use  of some  rather abstract  theorems  of Debreu,  both  the  existence  and  the  optimal-
ity of  competitive  equilibria in an  environment  with  private  information are es-
tablished.  These  results  illustrate  the  tremendous  power  of  the  work  of Arrow, 
Debreu,  McKenzie,  and  others in the  theory of general  economic  equilibrium. 
And  the  tie-in indicates  that  there  need  be  no  existence  and  welfare  anomalies 
for  a  large  class  of environments  with  private  information.  11 
Of  course  the use  of lotteries  to make  space  convex  and  to establish exis-
tence  in game  theory has  become  standard.  And  lotteries have  been  used  in 
41  Bayesian  games  which  have  private  information and  in social  choice  theory.  - But 
to  our knowledge  lotteries have  not  been  used explicitly in general  equilibrium 
competitive analysis.  Moreover,  we  establish in this  paper  that lotteries  some-
times  have  considerable  power  in overcoming  the barriers  to  trade  implicit  in 
the  incentive-compatibility conditions.  That  is,  private-information optimal 
deterministic allocations,  defined above,  need  not  be  optimal.  We  show  by  an 
11  In separate work  we  are establishing that  externalities  in  the  signaling 
environment  of Spence  [1974]  and Riley  [19791  and  the  insurance  environment  of 
Rothschild-Stiglitz  (1976]  and  Wilson  [1978]  can generate  nonexistence and  non-
optimality. 
~I  See  Myerson  [1979]  and  Fishburn  [1972a],  [1972b),  Gibbard  [1977],  Intriligator 
[1979],  Zeckhauser  (1969],[1973]  respectively.  Other  literature with  lotteries 
is cited below. -4-
example  that  there  can  exist a  stochastic allocation which  strictly dominates 
the best deterministic allocation 11.  The  example  itself can  be  interpreted 
as  a  model  of apparent  disequilibrium phenomena  (first-come  first-serve,  ra-
tioning,  queues,  etc.)  and  of securities with  contrived risk.  But  the  sto-
chastic allocation of the  example  is actually both an  optimal  allocation in 
the  relevant  (~~)  sense  and  a  competitive  equilibrium allocation in  the 
linear space containing lotteries.  The  example  thus  gives  a  hint of the  ex-
p1anatory  power  of the  constructs  we  develop  in this  paper,  and  of their we1-
fare  implications. 
There  is,  however,  one  standard  general  equilibrium result which  fails  in 
this  paper.  In  the  linear space  containing lotteries,  the  second  fundamental 
welfare  theorem,  that  optima  can be  supported as  competitive equilibria,  holds 
only with  qualifications.  We  find  these qualifications  revealing of  the  dif-
ficulties  of decentralization in environments  with  private  information. 
This  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  the  example  mentioned 
above  and  introduces  many  of  the  concepts which  are  developed  in  the  rest of 
the  paper.  Section 3  makes  explicit how  lotteries  overcome  the  barriers  to 
trade  and  the  nonconvexities  associated with  the  incentive-compatibility con-
ditions.  Section 4  describes  the  underlying  environment,  a  simple,  pure-exchange, 
dynamic  economy  with  period  by  period  shocks  to  individual preferences,  moti-
v~ted by  Lucas  [1980].  Section 4  goes  on  to  describe  the  linear space  con-
taining lotteries,  the  space  of signed measures,  and  the  linear product  space 
L  containing  shock-contingent  lotteries.  Consumption  sets  and  preferences 
are  defined  on  the  space  L;  certain incentive  compatibility conditions  are 
11  This  is consistent with  findings  in the  literature on  optimal  taxation, 
that  stochastic  taxation schemes  can strictly dominate  the best  deterministic 
schemes.  See Stiglitz  [1976]  and  Weiss  [1976]. -5-
loaded  into  the  consumption  set.  Implementable  allocations are  then defined 
by  certain resource  constraints  and  by  a  prior self-selection constraint.  A 
(private  information)  Pareto  optimum is also  defined.  Section  5  establishes  the 
existence  of an  optimum  by  consideration of  a  linear  programming  problem. 
Section 6  introduces  an aggregate  production set  in  the  space  L  and  then 
defines attainable states as  in Debreu  [1954].  The  production  set and  market 
clearing conditions  are  such  that attainable states are equivalent  with allo-
cations  satisfying  the  resource  constraints  in  the  pure  exchange  economy.  A 
price  system on  L  is also defined,  a  linear  functional.  Then  a  competitive 
equilibrium is  defined  in  the usual  way,  following  Debreu  [1954].  The  exis-
tence  of a  competitive  equilibrium  (in  the  linear  space  of signed  measures)  is 
established  for  various  approximate  economies,  in which  the  underlying  commodity 
space  is  finite,  using  a  theorem of Debreu  [1962]  for  Euclidean  spaces.  Then 
the  existence of  a  competitiv~ equilibrium for  the unrestricted  economy  is  es-
tablished by  taking  a  limit of  the  approximate  economies,  as  suggested  by' 
Bewley  [1972]. 
Section  7  considers  the  two  fundamental  theorems  of  contemporary welfare 
economics,  following  Debreu  [1954]  in linear spaces.  That  every  competitive 
equilibrium is an  optimum is virtually  immediate.  Also,  every  optimum can  be 
supported  as  a  competitive  equilibrium with  endowment  selection.  In  the  latter 
an agent  chooses  an  endowment  from  a  certain finite  set,  essentially by  announc-
ing his  initial preference  shock,  and  then  trades  from  that  endowment  subject  to 
the  usual  budget  constraint and  subject  to  a  self-selection constraint which  takes 
into account  the  preferences  of others,  and  which  depends  on  the  announced  type. 
Again,  we  find  these  qualifications  revealing  of  the  difficulties  caused  by 
private information. -6-
2.  A Model  of Rationing  and  of Securities with  Contrived  Risk 
Motivated  by  Lucas  [1980]  or  Gale  [1980J,  imagine  an  economy  with  a  continuum 
of households.  Each  household is  endowed  initially with  e  units  of  the  single 
consumption  good  of  the  mouel,  and  has  preferences  over  consumption  c  described 
by  the  utility function U(c,  e).  Here  U(·,  e)  is continuous,  strictly increasing, 
and  concave.  Parameter e is interpreted as  a  shock  to preferences at  the  begin-
ning  of  the  consumption period,  known  only  to  the  household  itself.  In  this 
sense  there is private information.  Parameter e is  viewed  ~ priori as  a  random 
variable,  taking  on  values e' and e
l 
with  probabilities A(e')  and  A(e
D
),  respec-
tively.  Suppose  also  that  A(e)  represents  the  fraction of households  in the 
population in the  consumption  period with  parameter  draw 6;  thus  there  is  no 
.  6/  aggregate  uncerta~nty. -
The  introduction of  shocks  to  preferences  may  be  viewed  as  somewhat  un-
satisfactory.  But  the  model  can  be  given  an alternative interpretation,  with 
shocks  to  technology.  Suppose  there are actually  two  goods  in the  economy,  a 
transferable  good  c  which  enters  as  an  input  into  the  household production 
function,  and  with which  the  household is  endowed  in amount  e,  and  a  nontransfer-
able  good  q,  the  output  of the household  production process  and  over  which  the 
household has  utility function  V(q).  Imagine  the household  production  tech-
nology  f  is subject  to  shocks e,  i.e.,  q  = fCc,  e),  where  parameter e is de-
scribed above.  As  Lucas  writes,  think of a  need  for  medical  services,  unantici-
pated to  the  household itself.  With  this  set up,  one  induces  an  indirect utility 
function  U over  the  input  good  c,  namely  U(c,  e)  = V[f(c, e)J. 
Now  as  a  special case  of  the  above  model,  suppose  that U(c, e')  is strictly 
~/  In  the  planning  period we  suppose  that  each  agent  knows  only what  the dis-
tribution of the  parameter in the  population will be,  and  it is thus  that  for 
each  the  A(e)  are  regarded as  probabilities.  There  are problems  in the  other 
direction,  from  independent  and  identically distributed random  variables  on  the 
continuum to  measurable  (integrable)  sample  paths.  Unlike  Malinvaud  [1973J  we 
deal directly in  the  limit  economy  with  a  continuum of agents. -7-
concave  and  continuously differentiable with U'(a,  6')  = =  and  U'(=,  e') = a, 
and  that U(c,  eU)  = kc.  Equivalently,  suppose  the  technology  f  is described  by 
q  = c
6 
where a < e' < 1  and e
U  = 1,  and  that  preferences over  q  are  described 
by  a  linear  function  V(q)  = q.  Thus,  either directly or indirectly,  households 
of type e' are ~  post  risk averse  and  household  of type e
U 
are ~  post risk 
neutral.  Admittedly  this specification is  somewhat  extreme,  but it will  serve 
us  well  in making  the points  of this section.  The  crucial  feature is that 
there  be  differences  in curvatures ~  post. 
Now  consider  the  following  resource allocation  scheme.  Prior  to  the real-
ization of  the  shock 6  some  central planner  (who  could  just as well  be  one  of 
the  households)  instructs all households  to  surrender  to  him all endowed  units 
of  the  consumption  good  e.  Then,  subsequent  to  the  revelation of  the  shock e, 
agents  are  asked  to  commit  themselves  to  a  choice of  one  of  two  distribution 
centers.  In the  first center the  planner  guarantees  an allotment  of c* units 
of the  consumption good.  In the  second,  household  are  offered the  possibility 
of c  units of  the  consumption  good,  but  there is  no  guarantee  (Here  c  > c*). 
Households  committed  to  the  second  center are  imagined  to arrive in a  random 
fashion  (independent of starting times)  and  to  receive  c  on  a  first-come  first-
serve basis.  Alternatively households  might  form  a  queue. 
All  households  believe  the  guarantee  in the first center and  assess  the 
probability  of being  served  in the  second  center  as a  and  of receiving zero 
as  1  - a.  They  then  commit  themselves  to  a  center,  and  their beliefs turn 
out  to  be self-fulfilling.  All who  choose  the first center receive c*,  and 
fraction a  of  those  who  choose  the  second  center  receive  c  while  fraction  1  - a 
go  away  empty-handed.  Collusion  among  households  has  been  ruled  our  ~ priori; 
71  households  must  respect  their position in  the  queue.  -
II  We  thank  John  Bryant  for  pointing  out  this  implicit restriction. -8-
Upon  observing  the  number  of unserved  customers  in the  second  center,  a 
casual  observer might  find  the above-described  scheme  somewhat  unsatisfactory. 
Since  some  go  away  empty-handed,  the  "price"  must  be  too  low,  that is,  the  po-
tential allotment  of  c  is  too  high.  In  fact,  if the  receipt were  lowered  to 
some  c**,  all could  be  served.  This  would  of course  be preferred ~  post  by 
those  who  go  unserved.  ~I 
The  above-described  scheme  can be  given  a  second  interpretation.  Prior  to 
the  realization of  shock e,  each household  agrees  to  surrender its endo\vment  e 
in exchange  for  a  security with  two  options.  Under  the  first  option  the  house-
hold  receives  c*.  Under  the  second  the household is  to  receive c,  but  there is 
a  possibility of default,  assessed at probability a.  That  is,  under  the  second 
option,  the  return is risky.  But  this  risk is entirely man-made. 
Situations with  such  contrived risk may  seem  somewhat  unusual.  Apart  from 
the activity of risk-lovers  (gamblers)  we  do  not  seem  to  see  agents  spinning 
wheels  of  fortune.  But if nature  provides  a  random  variable with  a  continuous 
density unrelated  to  any  households  preferences,  endowments,  or  technology,  then 
lotteries  can be  effected by  making  the allocations  contingent  on  the  realiza-
tions  of that  random  variable.  Thus  the  lottery would  not ~  inconsistent 
with  the  usual  state-contingent  treatment  of uncertainty.  21  In fact  a  random 
device  was  implicit in  the above-given model  of  first-come  first-serve,  which 
~I Of  course  this is not  the  only model  of apparent  underpricing.  In a  pro-
vocative article Cheung  [1977]  argues  that apparent  underpricing of better seats 
in theaters,  so  that  they fill up  early on,  is a  way  of reducing  the  costs  of 
monitoring  seat  assignments.  But  the  theory  developed here has  something  in 
common  with Cheung's,  the  use  of apparent  underpricing  to discriminate  among 
potential buyers  with  unobserved characteristics.  Such  discrimination also under-
lies  the  model  of credit-rationing of Stiglitz and  Weiss  [1980],  though  they  pro-
ceed  in a  different way  and  draw  somewhat  different  conclusions  than  the analysis 
of  this paper;  see also Aker10ff  [1970],  Stiglitz  [1976],  Wilson  [1977]. 
We  would  like  to  thank Kenneth  J.  Arrow  for  pointing  this  out  to  us. -9-
made  use  of  random arrival  times. 
It is  now  argued  that  there is  a  specification of c*,  c**,  c,  U(., 9')  and 
~ such  that  the  stochastic allocation of  the  above-described  scheme  is Pareto 
optimal.  Following Arrow  and  Debreu,  index consumption  by  the  shock 6.  That 
is,  let c(e)  denote  the  allocation of each  household  of  type e.  (We  insist  that 
each  be  treated identically as if each  had  no  name).  Suppose  also  that  the  as-
signment  of c(6)  to  households  of type  9  is possible,  as  if there were  full 
information,  even  though e is private  to  the household.  Then  consider the 
maximization of the  expected utility of the  (representative)  household,  prior 
to  the realization of shock 6,  by  choice  of consumption allocations c(9),  and 
subject  to  a  resource constraint that  economy-wide  average  consumption  not 
exceed  the  economy-wide  average  endowment.  That  is 
(2.1)  Max 
,  "  "  /I  II  A(6  )U[c(6  ) ,6  ]  +  A(6  )U[c(6  ),6  ] 
c (6')  ~ 0,  c (6")  ~ 0 
subject  to 
(2.2)  A  (9 ')  c (9 ') + A  (6 " ) c (6 ")  ~ e. 
Note  here  that  the  terms  A(6)  enter  the  objective  function,  the  expected 
utility of  the  representative household  prior  to  the  parameter  draw e,  as 
probabilities,  while  these  terms  enter  the  resource  constraint as  population 
proportions.  Necessary  and  sufficient conditions  for  a  solution to  this  prob-
lem  are: 
(2.3)  U'[c(6'),e'] 
~  1/  /I 
U  [c (6  ),  e ] 
(2.4) -10-
This  problem may  be  solved  in  two  steps  (see  Figure  1): 
First  let k  be  the  slope  of  the  linear utility function U(·,6
H
)  and  let  c* > 0 
denote  the  unique  solution  to 
(2.5)  U' [c (6 ')  , e ']  =  k. 





We  shall assume  for  purposes  of this  section that  e  >  c*,  as  depicted in 
Figure  1. 
Now  returning  to  the actual  private  information  economy,  one  notes  an 
apparently  severe  implementation  problem.  The  allocation c(6')  =  c*, 
cC6
H
)  =  c** with  c* < c**,  is unattainable,  at least in an  announcement  game 
with  truth-telling.  10/ 
H 
That  is, all agents  would  announce  6  and  receive  c**, 
but  of course  this  violates  (2.2).  But it is argued  that  the  appropriate  in-
centives  can  be  induced  by  going  to  lotteries and  exploiting differences  in 
risk aversion.  The  allocation c(6)  described  above  is  not  attainable.  But 
there is an allocation in lotteries which  is attainable  and  which  yields  the 
same  value  for  the  objective  function  (2.1).  In particular consider  a  lottery 
~'which is  a  random  choice  over  two  bundles  0  and  c  with probabilities  1  - a 
and':'  rt:spectively  and  has  mean  E  (c)  ==  (l~)O +  Cc'~  =  c**.  Figure  1  estab-
~ 
lishes  that  by  setting c  > c** it may  be  possible  to  get  the  dispersion of  the 
lottery  ~  large  enough  that  a  risk averse  household  prefers  the  sure  thing, 
10/ 
Building  on Harris  and  Townsend  [1977] [1981]  and  Myerson  [1979],  this  can 






Figure  1 
1/ 
U(c,e  ) 
........•.. _------
c  c*  e  c** 
OD  = expected utility of gamble  if ~  = e' 
OE  = utility of c* if e = e' 
e"  OF  =  utility for  both  c**  and  gamble  if e 
"..' 
./  ."  ."  U(c,e') 
consumption -11-
c*,  to  the  lottery~.  Thus  U(c*,9')  is  the  utility  to  housholds  of  typ~ 9'. 
Of  course  a  risk neutral household  would  prefer  the  lottery  ~ as  its mean  con-
sumption is higher,  and  would  achieve  the utility of  the  mean  U(C*~,9H). 
Finally  note  that with  the  above  scheme,  and  consequent  choice  of the agents, 
the  resource  constraint  is 
(2.6) 
Here  we  interpret  the  lottery  ~ as  a  situation in which  1~ is the  fraction of 
those  agents  who  choose  the  lottery who  are assigned 0,  and  similarly  for  ~ 
and  c.  Note  also  that  (2.6)  is satisfied since  E  (c)  = c**  and  (2.4)  is sat-
~ 
isfied by  construction.  We  have  thus  established that  the  above-described re-
source  allocation scheme  achieves  the utility of a  full-information  optimum. 
It is  therefore  private-information optimal  as  well.  11/ 
As  the  above-described allocation in lotteries is optimal,  it seems 
natural  to ask whether  such  an allocation can be  supported  as  a  competitive 
equilibrium.  We  establish here  that  such  a  competitive  equilibrium exists, 
making  the  point  that  the above-described apparent  disequilibrium phenomena  are 
in  fact  equilibrium phenomena,  and  that securities with  contrived  risk are  con-
sistent with  exchange  in competitive markets. 
For  this  purpose,  then,  imagine  that the  underlying  commodity  space C  is 
fin£te,  i.e.,  c  can  tnk~ on  nnly  a  finite  number  of valuAs.  The  household  is 
imagined  to  choose  a  probability measure  x(c,9),  c  E C on  this  finite  space 
,  H 
for  each  possible  value  of 0,  namelye  and e.  (Here  0  ~ x(c,9)  ~ 1  and 
11/  Note  that we  have  not  formally  defined  private-information optimal alloca-
tions.  Such  a  definition naturally  follows  a  more  general  treatment of the  in-
centive  compatibility conditions  in section 3.  In general,  full-information 
optimality is an  inappropriate welfare criterion;  by  altering  the  example,  fu1l-
information optimal allocations  can be  made  unachievable. -12-
~cECx(c,e) = 1.)  That  is,  the  household is  supposed  to announce  its actual  shock 
e,  and  receive  c  with  probability x(c,6).1£/  The  household is effectively endowed 
with  two  such probability measures  S(c,e')  and  S(c,e
u
),  each  putting mass  one  on 
the point e.  Preferences  of  the household  are  described by  expected utility over 
e  and  over  the  chosen  lotteries: 
(2.7)  ~A(e)  ~ x(c,e)U(c,9). 
e  c 
Imagine  also that there is an  intermediary or  firm in  the  economy  who  can 
make  commitments  to  buy  and  sell the  consumption  good  from  consumers  of different 
types.  A production choice y(c,e),  cEC  specifies  the  number  of units of the 
bundle with  c  units  of  the  consumption  good  which  the  firm must  deliver  to  con-
sumers  announcing  they  are  of type e.  (If y(c,a)  is negative  there is a  commit-
ment  to  take  in resources).  The  production set Y is defined  by 
(2.9)  Y  a  (y(c,e),  cEc,  a  a', e
l
:  L  A(e)~cy(c,a) so}. 
a  c 
Thus  the  firm cannot distribute more  than it takes  in. 
Finally  the  price  system in this  economy  is an  element  of  the  same  Euclidean 
space,  denoted p(c,a),  cEC,  a',e
u
•  We  then have  the  obvious 
Definition:  A competitive equilibrium is a  price  system  tP*(c,e)},  a  consumption 
allocation tx*(c,e)},  and  a  production allocation  (y*(c,6)j  such  that  the 
(x*(c,6)}  maximize  objective  function  (2.7)  subject  to  the budget  constraint 
(2.10)  ~ ~ p*(c,a)x(c,a)  s  L  L  p*(c,e)S(c,e); 
e c  e c 
12/  In  general  constraints  ensuring this  outcome will have  to be  imposed  ex-
plicitly.  Here  they are  not  needed. the  ty*(c,9)}  maximize  profits 
(2.11)  2:  2:  p~~(c,8)y(c,e) 
e c 
-13-
constrained by  the  production set  (2.9);  and  markets  clear 
(2.12)  x*(c,8)  = y*(c,9)  + S(c,9)  cEc,  a  a' a"  ,  . 
Now  for  an  equilibrium specification let the  price  system be 
p*(c,6)  = A(6)c,  let the  consumption allocation x*(c,6)  be 
x*(c*,9')  = 1  x*  (~,9  ")  = Ci  x* (0,9  ")  =  l-Ci 
and  let y*(c,9)  be  determined  by  (2.12). 
With  price  system p*(c,ij)  the  problem  facing  the  consumer  is 
subject  to 
Max  2:  A(e)  ~ x(c,6)  U  (c,a) 
9  c 
2:  2:  A(a)c  S(c,e)  = e. 
f:l  c 
This  is  just  the  stochastic  version of  program  (2.1)-(2.2).  The  allocation 
x*(c,e)  satisfies the  constraint  and  yields  value  equal  to  the  optimal  solu-
tion of  the  deterministic  program.  If some  allocations x**(c,6)  yielded greater 
value  than  x*(c,f:l)  for  the  stochastic  system,  the  deterministic  allocation with 
the  same  means  would  be  feasible  and  would  yield greater  value  for  the  determin-
istic problem that  that problem's  optimal  solution.  This is impossible,  estab-
lishing x*(c,a)  is optimal  for  the  stochastic  program.  By  construction of 
y*(c,6),  market  clearing condition  (2.12)  is  satisfied.  In addition under  p*(c,e) 
the  value  of  any  y€Y  is 
L l:  A(e)  c  y(c,9) 
a c -14-
which  is  nonpositive  by  definition of Y.  As  the  budget  constraint is binding  and 
y*(c,9)  = x*(c,e)  - S(c,9)  the  value  of y*(c,6)  is  zero.  Thus  y*(c,6)  maximizes 
profits.  Thus  the  existence  of a  competitive  equilibrium supporting  the  optimal 
allocation has  been established. 
3.  The  Use  of Lotteries  to  Overcome  Barriers  to  Trade  and  Nonconvexities 
Thus  far  there has  been  no  formal  treatment  of  the  incentive-compatibility 
conditions,  though  these  implicitly motivated  the  use  of lotteries in the  pre-
vious  section.  So,  returning  to  deterministic allocations  for  a  moment,  con-
e  9 --9',9".  sider a  set of shock-contingent  consumptions  c(  ),  Under  a  direct 
revelation mechanism with  truth-telling,  there  can be  an assignment  of  c(6)  to 
a  e-type agent  if and  only if 
U  [ c (6 ') ,9 ']  ~ U  [ c (6" ) ,9 ' ] 
(3.1) 
U [c (9" ) ,9"]  ~ U [c (9 ') ,e /I  ]  • 
These  are  the appropriate  incentive-compatibility conditions  in deterministic 
allocations  for  the  simple  economy  of  the  previous  section as  well  as  for 
economies  in which  the  consumption  set is a  subset  of  R~,  so  that  c(6)  is an 
£-dimensional  vector. 
We  should  emphasize  here  that each  agent  is  assumed  to  know  all aspects  of 
the  environment  other  than  the  particular parameter  draws  of  other agents.  For 
.  example,  the utility function U(·,9)  of others  is known  up  to  the  parameter 
draw  9.  Thus  conditions  like  (3.1)  or  their stochastic analogues  are  supposed 
to  capture  completely all the  incentive  (or disincentive)  effects  of private 
information in any  well-defined  game  or  resource allocation  scheme  for  our 
economy.  Hereafter we  shall  cease  to  make  reference  to  mechanisms  and  take 
conditions  like  (3.1)  to  be  natural restrictions  in the  space  of parameter--15-
contingent allocations.  They  are  for  us  a  given of the  analysis.  Thus  pri-
vate  information Pareto optima  are defined  relative to  such  restrictions. 
There  are  two  difficulties associated with  constraints  like  (3.1).  First 
these  constraints  impose  rather severe restrictions on  mutually beneficial 
exchange.  Second  the  space of parameter-contingent allocations  restricted by 
(3.1)  is generally  not  convex. 
To  illustrate the  first difficulty we  consider  the  single-commodity  economy 
of  the  previous  section.  Then,  with  more  preferred to  less,  conditions  (3.1) 
imply  that  c(6')  Ot  c(6")  and  c(6")  Ot  c(6').  Thus  the  only  implementable  alloca-
,  II 
tions  are  c(6  )  = c(9  ),  so  there  can be  no  gains  from  trade.  We  have  shown  in the 
previous  section that lotteries  sometimes  can  overcome  such barriers  to  trade. 
The  second  difficulty is  that  the  space  of parameter-contingent  allocations 
restricted by  (3.1)  is generally not  convex.  To  illustrate this consider  a  two-
commodity  economy  with  preferences  described  by  the utility function 
where  u(')  is strictly increasing and  strictly concave  and  where 
,  /I  o < 6  < e  <  1.  Then  the  nature  of condition  (3.1)  is illustrated in Figure  2a. 
The  preferences  of  the  agent  depend  on  the  parameter  draw  6:  Essentially, 
there are  two  sets of indifference  curves,  the  flatter  set  corresponding  to  the 
p~rameter draw 6'.  Thus  in Figure  2a  if c(6')  is the allocation to an  agent 
,  /I  e"  of type  6  ,  then  the allocation c(e  )  to  an agent  of type  which  satisfies 
(3.1),  must  lie in the  shaded  region.  Now  in Figure  (2b)  the pairs 
,  e"'  II  cA = (c(e  )A'  c(  )A)'  cB = (c(e  )B'  c(e  )B)  both satisfy  (3.1)  with 
c(9')A = c(e')B and  with  c(S")A  and  c(6")B  distinct but  both  on  the  upper  bound-
ary of  the  shaded  region.  Now  from  a  convex  combination of these  two  pairs, 
c(t) = tCA +  (l-t)cB,  0  <  t  <  1.  Then  tc(6
11
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shaded  region,  and  hence  c(t)  does  not  satisfy  (3.1).  See  Figure  2. 
To  illustrate how  this  nonconvexity is overcome  in the  space  of probability 
measures,  again  suppose  for  simplicity  that the  underlying  commodity  space  is 
finite,  i.e., c  can be  one  of a  finite  number  of possible bundles  in C.  Then  let 
xeS)  be  a  random  assignment  to  each  agent  of  type e,  where  x(c,6)  is  the  probability 
of bundle  c.  Then  a  parameter-contingent  random allocation  (x(e'),x(e
H»  can be 
achieved in a  direct-revelation mechanism with  truth-telling if and  only if 
(3.2a)  ~  U(c,~')x(c,e')  ~  ~  U(c,a')x(c,e') 
cEC  cEC 
(3.2b)  ~  U(c,e')x(c,e
H
)  ~  ~ 
H  , 
U(c,e  )x(c,6  )  • 
cEC  cEC 
These  conditions are  the  random  analogues  of  (3.1).  These  conditions are 
linear in the x(c,e)  and  therefore constitute  convex  constraints. 
In  the  previous  section no  use was  made  of  conve~ity in establishing the 
existence of a  competitive  equilibrium or its optimality.  But  in general  the 
incentive-compatibility conditions  must  be  imposed  explicitly,  as  constraints, 
and  convexity will be  needed. 
4.  The  Formal  Securities Model 
Consider  now  a  three-period model  with  a  continuum of agents  and t  commod-
ities.  Each  of the agents has  an  endowment  vector  et  »  0  in each  period t, 
t  ~ 0,1,2.  Letting ct  denote  the  consumption vector in period t,  each  agent 
has  preferences  over  consumption  sequences  (ct1;=0  as  described  by  the utility 
function 
Here  E is an  expectations operator  (the  random  variables will be  described -17-
momentarily).  Also  consumption is bounded,  0  ~ ct 
~ b.  Each  single-period 
utility function U(.,6t )  is  continuous,  concave,  and strictly increasing with 
u(0,6 t )  ~ O.  The  parameter 6t  is interpreted as  a  shock  to  individual pref-
erences at  the  beginning of period  t,  observed  only by  the  individual agent. 
For  simplicity parameter 6t  is assumed  to  take  on  only  a  finite  number  of 
values;  that is,  for  each  t, 6t  E e  = (1,2, .•• ,n}.  Fraction  ~(et)  of agents  in 
the  population have  the  parameter  draw 6 t  at  time  t,  where 
o <  ~(et) < 1,  ~e E eA(9  )  =  1.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  individual agent 
t  t 
at  the  beginning of time  0,  60  is known,  and  ~(6t)  represents  the  probability 
of  the  parameter  draw  6t  at  time  t,  t  = 1,2.  Notationa1ly it will be  convenient 
in what  follows  to  convert  the  parameter 60  to  the  parameter i, and  thus  we  may 
refer  to agents of type  i,  i  = 1,2, ••. ,n classified by  their initial parameter 
draw. 
We  have  deliberately kept  our  model  simple,  rather  than  attempting great 
generality.  Some  obvious  extentions  are possible.  First,  one  may  easily in-
crease  the  number  of periods  to  any  finite horizon.  Three  periods  were  the  small-
est number  necessary to illustrate the  nature  of  the  incentive compatibility con-
straints.  Second,  utility functions  may  be  supposed  to  depend  on  the  entire his-
tory of individual  shocks.  Third,  there  can  be  statistical dependence  in the 
6
t
,  t  ~ 1,  as  long as  there is  independence  from  the initial parameter 60  = i. 
Observable heterogeneous  characteristics and nontrivial  production could  be  in-
troduced.  We  did not  do  so  in order  to  focus  on  private information. 
This  section  now  makes  precise  the  notion of a  lottery on  the underlying 
space  of possible  consumptions.  The  space  of lotteries is  shown  to be  a  subset 
of a  linear space.  Individual  consumption sets,  preferences,  and  endowments  are 
defined  on  this  linear space.  Implementable allocations  and  Pareto  optimal 
allocations are also defined. -18-
.t 
First,  denote  the  underlying  commodity  space  by  C = tc E  R  :  0  ~ c  ~ b}  . 
We  then begin with  the  space  5  of all finite,  real-valued,  countable-additive 
set  functions  on  the Borel  sets of C,  denoted  by B(C),  i.e.,  functions  mapping 
such  Borel  sets  into the  rea1s.  The  operations of addition and  scalar mUltip-
lication are  defined as  follows: 
(i).  Given  any  two  elements  ~ and  ~ of 5,  a  third element  ~ +  ~ is 5 
called  the ~  is determined  by  the  condition 
(~ +  ~)(B) = ~(B) +  ~(B)  BEe (C) • 
(ii).  Given  any  real  number a  and  any  element  ~ of S,  a  second  element 
a~ in S  called  the  scalar product is determined by  the  condition 
BE 2(C). 
With  these  definitions  the  axioms  defining a  linear  space are  satisfied. 11/ 
Finally integration of measurable  functions  is well  defined.  -14/ 
13/  See  Kolmogorov  and  Fomin,  [1970],  p.  118.  The  zero  element  of S  assigns 
the  number  zero  to  every Borel  set and  the  negative  element  -~ of an  element 
~ is defined by  (-~)(B)  = -~(B)  for  every B E B(C).  Note  that  the  space  of 
probability measures  on  C is not  a  linear  space,  since if ~(C) = 1, 
(a~) (C)  < 1  for a  < 1. 
14/  Note  that here  and  below  the  integral is Lebesgue;  see  for  example  Ash 
[1972]  pp.  36-37.  Note  that  typically,  and  in Ash,  integration is defined 
relative  to measures,  i.e.,  nonnegative  real-valued,  countab1y-additive set 
functions.  By  the  Jordan-Hahn  decomposition  theorem,  however,  any  countably-
additive,  real-valued set  function  ~ on  the a-field B(C)  may  be  expressed 
as  the difference of  two  measures  ~+and ~-, i.e.,  ~ = ~+ - ~-.  Hence  for any 
Borel measurable  function h,  define  Shd(~+ - ~-) = Shd~+ - Sh~-J where  the 
two  terms  on  the  right-hand side are  defined  in the  usual  way.  For  this  last 
equality we  are also using  the  fact  that  for  any  two  measures  ~ and  ~ and  any 
two  scalars a  and S,  and  for  any Borel  measurable  function h, 
Shd(a~ +  e~) = aShd~ + e Shd~.  With  the  above-given definition of integration 
relative  to  general  countab1y-additive set  functions,  this  linearity continues 
to hold. -19-
Motivated  by  the previous  discussion  one  suspects  that "consumption"  in 
period  one  should  be  indexed  by  91  and  "consumption"  in period  two  should be 
indexed by  61  and 62,  This  leads  us  to  consider  the  space  L with  typical 
element  ~  =  [~O'  t~l  (6 1)},  t~2(61,62)}]  where  the  components,  ~O'  the  ~l  (6 1) 
and  the  ~2(al,e2)  are  each  elements  of S.  Addition  and  scalar multiplication 
on  the  space  L is defined in the  obvious  way  -- termwise.  Then  it is easily 
verified that since  S  is  a  linear space,  so  also is L.  Consumption  sets,  pref-
erences,  and  endowments  are all to  be  defined  relative  to  the  linear  space  L. 
Note  L is the  1  +  n  +  n2  cross  product  space  of  S. 
The  consumption sets  and  preferences  are defined  first.  Returning  to 
the  space  S,  recall  that  a  probability measure  p  is a  real-valued,  countably-
additive,  nonnegative  set  function with  p(C)  ~ 1.  Thus  a  probability measure 
pES is our  desired  notion of a  lottery.  The  one-period expected utility of 
an  agent  under  such  a  probability measure  p,  given  the  parameter  draw a,  is 
S U(c,6)p(dc). 
C 
Note  here  since U(·,6)  is continuous  on  compac.t  set C it follows  that  U(. ,6) 
is Borel  measurable  and  bounded.  Thus  expected utility is well  defined.  Now 
let 
P - t~ E  L:  ~O'  the  ~l(el)'  and  the  ~2(el,62)  are all probability measures  of S}. 
Then  given any  ~ E  P,  impose  the  further  requirement  that 
(4.1) 
Condition  (4.1)  is a  period  t  = 2  incentive  compatibility requirement.  Its 
analogue  in section 3  is  (3.2).  If restricted in period  t  = 2  to  choosing  a -20-
member  of  (~2(6l,e2)}  with  some  al  fixed  in advance,  the  representative agent 
would  weakly  prefer  ~2(~1,e2) if his  parameter  draw  is 92,  Given  (4.1),  the 
period  t  = 1  incentive compatibility requirement  is 
(4.2) 
If asked  in period  t  = 1  to  choose  a  member  of  (~1(al)'(~2(el,e2)}}  the  repre-
sentative agent  would  weakly  prefer the  pair  (~1(9l)'(~2(9l,62)}) if his  param-
eter draw  is actually a l • 
Finally let 
x =  (~E P:  ~ satisfies  (4.1)  and  (4.2)}. 
The  space Xc L is the  consumption  set of the representative agent.  Given  any 
x  E X,  let preferences  be  given by 
A point  x
O 
E X  is a  satiation point in X  for agent  i  if  W(x,i) 
o 
~W(x ,i)  for all  x  EX. 
The  endowment  of agent  i  in each period  t  is  a  l-dimensional vector 
et  »  0,  et  E  C.  So  let S  be  that  element  of P  such  that  So  puts all mass  on 
eO'  Sl (e 1)  puts all mass  on  el  for  each e  1  E e,  and  S2 (9 1,62
)  puts all mass  on 
e2  for e  l,e  2  E e. -21-
We  now  have  a  pure  exchange  economy  defined  by  the population  fractions 
A(i),  i  E e =  (1,2, •.• ,n},  the  linear  space L,  the  common  consumption  set Xc L, 
the  common  endo~.;ment  ~ E  L,  and  preferences We' ,i)  defined  on  X  for  every agent 
of type i,  i  E e. 
An  imp1ementab1e  allocation for  this  economy  is an  n-tuple  (x.)  with 
~ 
x.  E X for  every  i  which  satisfies  the  resource  constraints  in each  period t, 
~ 
t  =  0,1,2, 11/ 




and  which  satisfies a  prior self-selection constraint 
(4.7)  W(x. ,i)  2  W(x. ,i) 
~  .  J 
V  i,j E e. 
The  three  resource  constraints  (4.4)  - (4.6)  are  the  analogues  of  (2.6)  in 
the  example  of section  2.  Thus  we  assume  that  fraction  xiO(B)  of  the  agents 
of type i,  those  who  have  chosen  the  lottery xiO '  is  assigned  an allocation 
in B E B(G)  in period zero,  and  similarly for  xil(B,9 l),  xi2(B,91,9 2). 
11/  The  integration below is coordinate wise.  Thus  in  (4.4)  for  example, 
where n.(c)  is the projection of c  onto  the  jth coordinate  axis. 
J -22-
The  prior self-selection constraint  captures  the  idea  that  an  allocation 
(Xi)  can be actually  implemented  only if each agent  of  type  i  reveals  his 
true  type  by  the  choice  of  the  bundle x.  from  among  the  n-tuple  (xi) •  1. 
An  implementab1e allocation  (xi)  is said  to  be  a  Pareto  optimum if 
there  does  not  exist an  implementab1e  allocation  (x~)  such  that 
(4.8)  W(x~  ,i)  2  W(x. ,i) 
1.  .  1.  i=1,2, ...  ,n 
with  a  strict inequality for  some  i. 
5.  Existence  of  a  Pareto Optimum 
To  establish the  existence of a  Pareto  optimum  for  our  economy  it is 
enough  to  establish  the  existence of a  solution to  the  following  problem. 
Problem  (1): 
(5.1) 
where 
Maximize  a  weighted average  of  the utilities  of  the  agent  types 
!: W(i)  W(x.,i) 
i  1. 
o < w(i)  <  1,  ~ w(i)  = 1 
i 
by  choice  of the  n-tuple  (xi)'  xi E X,  subject  to  the  resource  constraints 
(4.4)  - (4.6)  and  the prior self-selection constraint  (4.7).  We  wish  to 
make  use  of  the  theorem that continuous  real-valued  functions  on  nonempty, 
compact  sets have  a  maximum. 
We  need  to  introduce a  topology  on  the  space of probability measures 
so  notions  of continuity and  compactness  may  be  well  defined.  Let  P* 
denote  the  space  of probability measures  with  common  sigma  algebra a (C), 
the  Borel  sets  of  the underlying  commodity  space  C.  Let  the  topology  on  p* -23-
be  defined  by  integrals of  (bounded)  continuous,  real-valued  functions  on  C.  16/ 
That  is,  let sets  of  the  form 
1,2, ... ,J} 
define  the  base  for  our  topology,  where  ~o is an arbitrary probability measure 
in  P7<,  f.  is  an  arbitrary  (bounded)  continuous  function  on  C,  €.  is an arbitrary 
J  J 
positive  number,  and  J  is an arbitrary positive integer.  With  this  topology 
a  sequence  of measures  ~m in  p*  converges  to  a  measure  ~  in  p*  if and  only if 
lim S f(c)~m(dc) 
nf7CO 
.'  J  f(c)\1(dc) 
for  every  (bounded)  continuous  function  f  on  C.  Notationally  we  write 
III  W  \1  ~~, i.e., weak  convergence  of measures. 
i. 
The  underlying  commodity  space  C is a  subset of R  ,  and  so  is  a  separable 
metric  space.  It follows  that  the  space  of probability measures  on  C,  P*, 
with  the  above  topology,  is metrizable,  i.e.,  there  exists  a  metric  on  p* 
which  induces  the  same  open  sets.  (See  Parthasarathy  [1967J,  Theorem 6.2, 
Chapter  2.)  Horeover,  since  C is  compact,  p*  is  a  compact  (metric)  space 
(Parthasarathy,  Theorem  6.4,  Chapter  2).  Since  P,  to  which  the x.  belong, 
l. 
2  of  p*  and  we  are  concerned  with  (x.) ,  is  the  (Hn+n  )  product  space  the  n-tuple 
l. 
pn  of  P  and  therefore  2  product  of  P*.  let  be  the  n  product  space  the  n(Hn+n  ) 
n 
~et  the  topology  on  P  be  the  product  topology.  (See  Royden  [1968]  Theorem  19, 
p.  166).  Since  p*  is metrizable,  so  also  in pn  (Royden  [1965],  p.  151).  Hence 
pn  is a  compact  metric  space.  Con1lergence  of measures  in  pn  is equivalent with 
~/  We  similarly introduce  a  topology  on  S  and  the associated  1  +  n  +  n
2 
product  topology  on  L. -24-
weak  convergence  of measures  coordinate-wise. 
The  objective  function  in  Problem  (1)  is  (5.1).  From  (4.3)  we  have 
(5.2)  W(xi,i)  - j  U(c,i)xiO(dc) + ~  ~(61)  SU(c,61)xil(dc,6 l ) 
1 
To  establish continuity  of  (5.1)  it is  enough  to  show  that  for  every  sequence 
~" 
(x~)  ~ (x.), 
~  ~ 
n 
~  Jl(i)W(x~,i) 
rtr+<D  i=l  ~ 
lim 
So  it is  enough  to  show  that 
(5.3)  lim  W(x~,i) 








ifi € e. 
Since  the  U(·,S  )  are  (bounded)  continuous  functions  on  C,  the  continuity of 
t 
W(',i)  with  respect  to  x.  is  immediate. 
~ 
Now  consider  the  domain  of  the  choice  elements  in Problem  (1),  space pn 
restricted by  the  resource  constraints  (4.3)  - (4.6),  the  prior self-selection 
constraint  (4.7)  and  the  incentive  compatibility constraints  (4.1)  and  (4.2) 
for  each  agent  type.  Call  this  space  T.  This  restricted space  T is  nonempty 
d  1  =-n.  since it contains  the  en  owment  n-tup  e,  ~  As  closed  subsets  of  compact 
spaces  are  compact  (Kolmogorov  and  Fomin  [1970J,  Theorem  2,  p.  93),  we  need 
only  establish T is  closed.  So  it is  enough  to  establish  that given any 
w 
sequence  (x~) ~ (x.)  with  (X~)€T,  that  (x.)€T.  Now  if  (x~)€T,  then  in  (4.1) 
~  ~  ~  ~  ~ 
for  e:~ample -25-
Taking  the  limit of this  inequality as  m7=,  and  using  the  fact  that u(·,92) 
is a  (bounded)  continuous  function,  one  obtains 
A similar argument  applied  termwise  establishes  the  desired property  for  (4.2). 
The  same  type  of argument  is used  to  establish  the  desired  property  for  (4.7), 
and  also  for  the  resource  constraints  (4.4)  - (4.6),  where  coordinate-wise 
the  integrand is  a  (bounded)  continuous  function. 
We  conclude  by  noting  (again)  that continuous  real-valued  functions  on 
compact  topological  spaces  achieve  a  maximum.  (Royden  [1968],  Proposition 9, 
p.  161).  Hence  the  existence  of a  Pareto  optimum is established. 
The  above  argument  relies heavily  on  the  compactness  of  C.  In  fact  this 
assumption is crucial.  By  modifying  the  first  example  of section  2  where  C 
is not  compact  we  have  produced  an  environment  in which  one  can get arbitrarily 
close  to but  not  attain the utility of  a  full-information  optimum;  thus  for 
this  environment  a  Pareto  optimum  does  not  exist. 
6.  Existence  of a  Competitive  Equilibrium 
In this section we  establish  that  our  economy  can  be  decentralized with 
a  price system,  that is,  that  ther~ exists a  competitive  equilibrium.  We  ac-
complish  this  task by  introducing a  firm into  the analysis,  with  a  judiciously 
chosen  (aggregate)  production set.  We  then  follow  the spirit of a  method 
developed  by  Bewley  (1972]  for  establishing  the  existence of a  competitive 
equilibrium with  a  continuum of commodities.  Various  approximate  economies 
are  considered,  with  a  finite  number  of commodities.  Existence of a  competitive -26-
equilibrium for  these  economies  is established with  a  theorem of Debreu  (1962). 
One  then  takes  an appropriate  limit. 
Let  there be  one  firm  in our  economy  with  production set Y C  L,  where 




To  be  noted  here is that  the  components  of  some  yEY  are  elements  of S,  and  thus 
each  is a  way  of adding.  A negative weight  corresponds  to  a  commitment  to 
take  in resources  and  positive weight  corresponds  to a  commitment  to dis-
tribute resources.  Thus  in (6.1),  for  example,  the  term SCjYO(dC)  should be 
interpreted as  the  net  trade  (sale)  of  the  jth consumption  good  in period 
zero.  Inequality  (6.1)  states that as  a  clearing house  or intermediary,  the 
firm cannot  supply  more  of the consumption  good  than it acquires.  When  indexed 
by  the  parameter e,  a  component  of y  should  be  interpreted as  a  commitment  to . 
agents  who  announce  they are of type e.  The  production set Y,  it should  be  noted 
contains  the  zero  element  of L  and  also displays  constant  returns  to  scale. 
Following  Debreu  [1954]  we  define  a ~  of our  economy  as  an  (n+l)-
tuple  [(xi),y)  of elements  of L.  A state  [(x.),y)  is said  to  be  attainable 
1 
if xiEX  for  every  i Ee ,  yEy,  and  E~=lA(i)xi- y  =  S.  Now  suppose a  state 
[(x.),y]  is attainable.  Then  setting y  =  L.A(i)x.  - S in  (6.1)  - (6.3),  one 
111 
obtains  the  resource constraints  (4.4)  - (4.6).  Similarly,  given any  n-tuple 
(x.),  x.EX,  satisfying the  resource constraints  (4.4)  - (4.6),  define  y  by 
1  1 -27-
y  =  ~.l(i)~.  - ~,  and  then yEY.  Thus  there  is  a  one-to-one  correspondence  between 
~  ~ 
attainable states in the  economy  with production  and  allocations  in  the  pure 
exchange  economy  satisfying the  resource  constraints.  An  attainable state 
[(xi),y]  is said  to  be  a  Pareto  optimum if the  n-tuple  (Xi)  satisfies  (4.7) 
and  there  does  not  exist an attainable state  [(x~),y']  which  satisfies  (4.7) 
~ 
and  Pareto dominates,  i.e., satisfies  (4.8).  Again  there is a  one-to-one 
correspondence  between optimal  states and  optimal allocations. 
A price  system  for  our  economy  is  some  real-valued  linear  functional 
on  L,  that is,  some  mapping  v  L~~.  More  will be  said about  price 
2  systems  v  in what  follows,  but we  may  note here  that  v  will  have  (l+n+n  ) 
components  each  of which  is a  continuous  linear  functional  on  S  relative 
to  the  weak  topology.  That is,  given  some  ~ E  L,  then 
where  the  functions  fO(')'  fl("~l)'  f2(·,61,62)  are  (bounded)  continuous 
functions  on  C.  (See  Dunford  and  Schwartz,  [1957],  Theorem  9,  p.  421). 
We  now  make  the  following 
Definition:  A competitive  equilibrium is a  state  [(x~),y*]  and  a  price  system 
~ 
v*  such  that 
(i)  for  every i, xt maximizes  W(xi,i)  subject  to  Xi  E X and 
v*(x.)  ~ v*(~); 
~ 
(ii)  y* maximizes  v*(y)  subject  to y  E Y;  and 
(iii) 
An  outline of our  proof  for  the  existence of  a  competitive  equilibrium -28-
for  our  economy  is as  follows.  First  the  underlying  commodity  space  C is 
restricted to a  finite  number  of points,  the  nodes  of a  mesh  or grid on  C. 
In this restricted economy  a  countably-additive,  real-valued set  function is 
completely defined  by  an  element  of a  Euclidean space,  with  dimension equal 
to  the  dimension of the restricted C.  The  linear space  of these restricted 
economies  is  the  1 +  n  +  n2  cross  product  of this Euclidean space.  Consumption 
sets,  preferences,  endowments,  and  a  production set may  be  defined  on  this 
space  in the  obvious  way.  The  existence of a  competitive  equilibrium for  the 
restricted economy  is established using  a  theorem of Debreu  [1962].  Then  let-
ting the  grid get  finer  and  finer,  one  can  construct a  sequence  competitive 
equilibria  for  the  economies  which  are  less and  less  restricted.  A subsequence 
of these  competitive allocations  and  prices  converges  and  the  limiting alloca-
tions  and  prices are  shown  to  be  a  competitive  equilibrium for  the unrestricted 
economy.  We  now  give  a  more  detailed argument. 
The  first  restricted economy  may  be  constructed in an  essentially arbitrary 
way  by  subdividing each  of the  ~  coordinate  axes  of  the  commodity  space  C into 
intervals,  subject  to  the  following  restrictions.  First,  each  endowment  point 
e
t
,  t  =  0,1,2,  must  be  one  of  the  nodes  of  the  consequent  grid.  Second,  let-
ting 
(6.4)  c* > max 
°  i 
,...  eO  c* > max  ~  et  ..,  for  t  = 1,2, 
LA (i)J'  t  LA(6 t)J 
each  point  c~,  t  = 0,1,2 must  be  one of these  nodes.  (We  thus  suppose  that 
the  upper  bound  b  of C is  such  that 0  < c* S  b).  Third,  the  element  zero must 
t 
be  an  element  of  the  consequent  grid.  The  first of these restrictions will 
mean  the  endowment  points lie in each  of  the  restricted consumption sets,  and 
the  second will mean  that  no  agent  is ever  satiated in his attainable consump--29-
tion sets.  (See  condition b.1  of  the  theorem below). 
The  second restricted economy  is  obtained  from  the  first  by  equal  sub-
division of  the original intervals of  the L  coordinate  axes.  The  third is 
obtained by  equal  subdivision of  the  second,  and  so  on.  In what  follows  we 
let the  subscript k  be  the  index  number  of  the  sequence  of restricted  economies. 
Note  that  the  length of each  of  the  intervals  goes  to  zero  as  ~=, so  that 
these  grids  are  finer  and  finer. 
k  For  the  kth restricted economy  let C  be  the  restricted underlying  com-
modity  space  and  Lk  be  the  finite  dimensional  subspace  of L  for  which  the 
support  of each  of the  n2 + n +  1  measures  is Ck.  That  is,  let xO(c),  the 
xl(c,el )  and  the  x2(c,  ~l'  ~2)  for  c  E  C
k 
each  be  the  measure  of  tc},  the  set 
containing  the  single  point c.  Then  the  space  Lk  is finite  dimensional  and  a 





2 E S.  Note  that  the  integral  of an  integrable  function  f:  c~ R with 
respect  to  a  measure  x  on  Ck  is 
(6.5) 
r  J f(c)x(dc)  = 
c 
l::  f(c)x(c). 
c  E  Ck 
The  consumption  and  production possibility sets  for  the  kth  restricted 
k  k  k  k  economy  are X  = X n Land Y  = Y n L  respectively.  By  result  (6.5),  the 
integrals  used  in the  definition of X,  Y and W,name1y  in  (4.1)-(4.2),  (6.1)-
_  (6.3)  and  (4.3)  respectively,  have  representations  as  finite  sums  over  the 
elements  of Ck.  As  eO'  e1  and  e2  belong to Ck ,  the  endowment  for  economy  k 
is  Sk  = S ELk. 
As  our  linear space  for  the kth restricted economy  is  a  subset of 
Euclidean  space,  the  price  system is also an  element of  this  Euclidean  space. 
Thus  we  may  define  a  price  system pk  =  (p~(c»,  (p~(c,e1»'  (p~(c,61,62»}' -30-
~1,e2E8, where  each  component  is  an  element  of  R. 
Now  let m be  the  least  common  denominator  of the  A(i),  i  = 1,2, ...  ,n and 
consider  the kth  restricted finite  economy  containing  number  A(i)m  agents of 
type  i  and  production set myk  lZ/  Now  restrict attention to  an  m-agent 
economy  in which all agents  of any  given  type  i  must  be  treated identically. 
Then  following  Debreu  [1962]  we  have  the  following 
Definition:  a  quasi-equilibrium of  the  kth restricted finite  economy  is a  state 
k*  k*  k* 





k*  for  every i,  is  x.  a  greatest 
~ 
under W(· ,i)  and/or  p 
k*  k*  Max  p  my  = 




p  :f  O. 
k*  p 
_k  = mS 




k*  = p 
{Xi  E Xk:  k*  S;  k*  p  . x.  p 
~ 
Sk  Nin  p  k*  Xk.  =  , 
A quasi-equilibrium is a  competitive equilibrium if the  first part of con-
dition  (Q')  holds.  In what  follows  we  shall establish  the  existence  of a 
ski 
quasi-equilibrium using a  theorem of Debreu  [1962],  and  then establish direct-
ly that it is also  a  competitive  equilibrium.  It is immediate  that  a  compet-
itive equilibrium for  the kth restricted finite  economy  is also a  competitive 
equilibrium for  the  original kth restricted economy  with  a  continuum of agents 
(m  cancels  out of conditions  (6)  and  (Y)). 
We  make  use  of  the  follmo1ing  theorem,  as  a  special case of Debreu  [1962], 
lZl  We  are assuming  that  each "-(i)  is rational.  An  extension  to arbitrary 
real  "-(i) 's 1oJould  entail a  limiting argument. -31-
Theorem  (Debreu):  The  kth  restricted finite  economy  has  a  quasi-equilibrium 
if 
(a .1) 
(a.2)  k  X  is closed and  convex; 








f  .,  ~k  h'  ..  xk  or  every  consumpt~on xi  ~n Ai'  t  ere  ~s  a  consumpt~on ~n 
preferred  to xi' 
'.  Xk  for  every xi  ~n  ,the sets 
tx.  €  Xk  W(x.,i)  ~ W(x~,i)} 
~  ~  ~ 
for  every  x~ in Xk 
~  , 
is convex, 
k  o €  mY, 
the  set  tx.  €  Xk 
~ 
W(x. ,i)  ~ W(x~,i)}  1.  ~ 
where  A(H)  is  the asymptotic  cone  of set H,  mH  =  ts  :  s  =  mh,  h  €  H},  and  X~ is  the 
bl  f  h  i th  .  kth  .  d  attaina  e  consumption  set  or  t  e  type  consumer  1.n  restr~cte  economy. 
Each  of  these  conditions  holds  for  our restricted finite  economy,  as -32-
We  indicate  in the  appendix.  Thus  the  existence of a  quasi-equ~librium is 
established.  We  now  verify  that  the  first part of  condition  (a)  must  hold. 
In a  quasi-equilibrium condition  (S)  holds,  i.e., there exists  a  maximizing 
k  k*  element  in Y  given p  k*  It follows  that  no  component  of p  can  be 
negative.  Also  from  condition  (5)  not all components  can be  zero.  There-
k*  fore  at  least one  component  of p  is positive.  Ma  •  •.  k*  .  h 
x~m~z~ng p  .  y  w~t 
respect  to  y  in yk  one  obtains 
(6.6a)  k*(  )  _  .I.k 




).,(c  ) A(6  Hk  .  c  =  0 
122 
'fc  c  Ck 
'-
'f c  E  Ck , 'fij 1  E e 





k  where  the  ~t'  t  = 0,1,2 are  nonnegative £-dimensional vectors  of Lagrange multi-
pliers.  By  virtue of the  existence of a  maximum  and  the  existence  of at least 
one  positive price,  one  of  these  Lagrange multipliers is positive.  Thus 
k  k  +  ~k  0  .1.  +  .1.  e  .  e  >  = ~O  .  eO  ~l'  1  2  2 
since  et  > 0,  t  = 0,1,2.  But  the  measure which  puts  mass  one  on  the  zero 
element  of  the  underlying  commodity  space  for all possible parameter  draws 
k* 
has  valuation zero  under  p 
k*  Thus  p 
part of condition  (a)  cannot hold. 
k  k*  k  S  > Min  p  .  X  and  the  second 
Now  x~* denotes  the  maximizing  element  for  the  ith agent  type  in a 
~ 
(  k*}=  competitive  equilibrium of  the kth restricted economy.  For  any i,  xi  k=O 
is a  sequence  in the  space  of  1 +  n +  n2  dimensional  vector~ of probability 
measures  on  the  underlying  consumption  set C.  This  ~etric space is  compact, 
so  there  exists  a  convergent  subsequence.  Since  there are  a  finite  number of agent  types,  it is thus  possible 
allocations  (x~*)} which  converges 
~ 
-33-
to  construct  a  subsequence  of  the  sequence 
=  to  some  allocation  (x.).  It may  be  guessed 
~ 
=  that  this  limit,  (Xi)'  will constitute part of an equilibrium specification 
for  the unrestricted economy. 
For  every  restricted economy  k,  the  price  system is  (6.6).  Moreover, 
the  price  system may  be  normalized by  dividing  through  by  the  sum  of all the 
Lagrange  multipliers  so  that  in fact  each  Lagrange multiplier may  be  taken 
to  be  between  zero  and  one.  Thus  one  may  again find  a  further  subsequence  of 
sequence  of vectors  (~~}  which  converges  to  some  number  l~:}  with  components 
between  zero  and  one.  Moreover  the  Lagrange multipliers  in  (~~  must  sum  to  1. 
In what  follows  then we  restrict attention to  the  subsequence  of economies, 
h~ =  h  ~ 
indexed by  h,  such  that  for  every i, Xi -t  Xi  and  for  every t,  ~  t  .-,  ~ t' 
For  each  economy  h  the  equilibrium price  system is a  linear functional 
h  v  defined  by 
(6.7) 
h 
v  (x)  = 
=  •  c  Xo ( c )  + Z  ).. (9 1)  i:  ,I, h  (9 )  k fl' c  Xl  c,  I 
91  cEC 
=  Thus  it may  be  guessed  that an  equilibrium price  system  v  for  the unrestricted 
economy  will be 
(6.8) -34-
CD 
A(e  ) '¥  2  2 
Note  that  since  the  sum  of  the  Lagrange multipliers  is strictly positive, 
CD 
V  (~)  > O. 
<:0 
It is first established that  x.  solves  1. 
(6.9) 
Max  W(x,i) 
x  E X 
s.t. 
Note  that  in the  competitive  equilibrium of  the hth restricted finite  economy, 
h*  xi  solves 
Max  W(x,i)  s.t. 
x  E Xh 
(6.10) 
h  h  h 
v  (x)  S;  v  (S  ). 
So  from  (6.21)  and  the  definition of  vh  in  (6.7) 
(6.11) 
s;  'I,h  +  'I,h  .  e  +  ,,,h 
'0  .  eO  '1  1  '2' e2  . 
h* w  =  (6  1)  .  .  (bounded)  Recalling that xi  ~ xi  '  and  noting that  in  .1  we  are 1.ntegrat1.ng 
continuous  functions  on  C,  we  may  take  the  limit of both  sides  of  (6.11)  as -35-
::c 
h~ oo,  and  obtain that xi satisfies  (6.9).  =  Thus  x.  is a  feasible  solution. 
~ 
0) 
Now  suppose  x.  is not  a  maximizing  element,  so  that  there  exists  some  i.E X 
~  ~ 
satisfying  (6.9)  with 
<XI 
W(x.,i)  > W(x.,i). 
~  ~ 
~h  h  h*  Then it is possible  to  construct  some  x.  such  that W(x.,i)  > W(x.  ,  i)  and 
~  ~  ~ 
This will contradict  x~* as  maximizing  in the hth restricted 
~ 
CD 
Now  define  y 
CD 
1:  A(i)x. 
~  - s. 
0) 
We  want  to  show  y  solves 
i 
0) 
Max  v  (y). 
yEY 
Then  we  will  have  both  profit maximization  and  market  clearing,  the  remaining 
conditions of a  competitive equilibrium to  be  verified.  First note  that  the 
0) 
budget  constraint  (6.9)  may  be  assumed  to hold  as  an  equality undar x ..  Then 
~ 
0) 
inserting the  functional  v  from  (6.8),  mUltiplying  through  by  A(i)  and  summing 
over  i 
CD 
(6.12)  ~O 
We  shall  make  use  of  (6.12)  below. 
maximizing  production vector in yh. 
the  definition of yh 
h*  Now  in each  restricted economy  h,  y  is the 
Thus  from  the  market  clearing condition and 
18/  For  the details of this  argument  see Prescott  and  Townsend  [1979]  . -36-
(6.13)  "  \(i) 
,"'  h*  S;  e  ,:..  J  c  xiO(dc) 
i  0 
(6.14)  I.  ).. (6
1
)  L  ).. (i) 
r  h* 
j  c  Xil (dc ,6 1)  S;  e 
91  i  1 
(6.15)  I.  ).. (9
1
)  L.  ).. (9
2




1  62  i 
h* w  cx>  Taking  the  limit as  ~cx>,  recalling that x.  ~ x.,  and  noting that we  are 
1  1. 
integrating  over  (bounded)  continuous  functions 
(6.16 )  J 
cx> 
I. )..(i)  c  xiO(dc)  s;  e 
i  0 
(6.17)  L:  ).. (9 1)  L)..(i)  S c 
cx> 
xil  (dc ,9 1)  s;  e 
t:ll  i  1 
(6.18) 
cx>  cx>  cx> 
So  from  the  construction of y  ,y  E Y.  Now  under  the  price  system v  ,  the 
problem of  the  firm is 
co 
+  ~2 
subject  to  (6.1)-(6.3).  Thus  profits are  nonpositive. 
co 
cx> 
~~reover at y  profits 
are zero,  using  (6.12).  Hence,  y  is profit maximizing.  This  completes  the 
proof of  the  existence of a  competitive  equilibrium for  the  limit  economy. 
It is readily verified that  for  one-period  economy  (with  period  zero -37-
only)  there  need  be  no  randomness  in a  competitive equilibrium.  Agents  are 
risk averse,  and  the  incentive-compatibility conditions  need  not  be  imposed 
explicitly.  In this  sense  the  work  developed here  reduces  to  standard  compet-
itive analysis when  the  information structure is private but  not  seauential. 
7.  The  Welfare  Theorems 
We  now  turn  to  the  two  fundamental  theorems  of contemporary welfare 
economics  and  ask whether  any  competitive equilibrium allocation is optimal 
and  whether  any  optimum  can  be  supported  in a  competitive  equilibrium.  Both 
questions  may  be  answered  in  the affirmative,  but  the  second  affirmative 
answer  has  some  revealing qualifications. 
In  the  context of private  information we  rely heavily  on  Debreu's  [1954] 
treatment  in general  linear spaces.  To  establish that  any  competitive  equilib-
rium is an  optimum,  just  two  properties are  sufficient: 
(I)  X is  convex. 
(II)  'if  x',  x"  E  X and V  iEe, 
,,,  ;  ex 
W(x  ,i) < W(x  ,i)  implies W(x  ,i) < W(x  ,i) 
a  ,  /I 
where  x  = (1  - a)x  + ax  ,0 < a  < 1. 
For  property I,  note  that a  linear combination of  two  probability measures 
is again  a  probability measure,  and  that constraints  (4.1)  and  (4.2)  hold 
under  convex  combinations,  as  indicated in the  discussion in Section 3. 
For  property II, it is readily verified that 
a  ,  II 
W(x  ,i)  =  (1  - a)  W(x  ,i) + aw(x  ,i). 
That  is,  the objective  function  is  linear in probability measures,  a  natural 
consequence  of  the  expected-utility hypothesis.  In  summary  we  have -38-
Theorem  1:  Every  competitive equilibrium with  state  (x*,y*)  and  price  system 
v*  is an  optimum. 
Proof:  The  proof  follows  Debreu  [1954]  quite closely.  For  details  see  Prescott 
and  Townsend  [1979]. 
To  establish that  any  optimum  can be  supported as  a  competitive equilibrium 
three  more  properties are  sufficient: 
(III)  Tf  x,  ,  "  x  ,  x  E  X and Tf  iEG!,  the  set  [a  E[O, 1] : 
a  ,  /I 
is closed where  x  = (1  - O')x  + ax 
(IV)  Y is  convex. 
(V)  Y  has  an  interior point. 
Property III  follows  immediately  from  the  linearity of  the  objective  function. 
Property  IV  follows  from  the  linearily of L and  from  the  fact  that  constraints 
(6.1)-(6.3)  hold  under  convex  combinations.  For  property V pick a  degenerate 
element  of  L  such  that  (6.1)-(6.3)  hold  as  strict inequalities. 12/  There  now 
follows 
Theorem  2:  Every  optimum  [(x~),  y*]  for  which  the  set N =  [(x.):  x.  E X~(x~), 
~  ~  ~  ~  ~ 
x~ E  x:(~) for at least one  k,  (Xi)  satisfies  (3.7)}  is  n0nempty,  is associat-
ed with  a  nontrivial  continuous  linear functional  v*  on  L such  that 
(1)  X~ solves 
~ 
Min  v*(x.) 
~  ~ 
xiEX. (x~) 
~  ~ 
19/  Here  the  interior point is relative to  the  product  topology  on  L;  see 




W(x. ,j)  ~ W(x~ j) 
1  J, 
y*  solves 
~( *)  =  x.  X. 
1  1 
Max  v*(y) 
yEy 
(x.  E X: 
1 
-39-
'if  j  i:  i, 
W(x.,i)  ~ W(x~,i)} 
1  1 
Proof:  Again  the  proof  follows  Debreu  [1954]  with  suitable modifications. 
For  details  see  Prescott and  Townsend  [1979]. 
Here  of  course  x~ is a  minimizer  of  expenditure  on  the  weak  upper  contour 
1 
set relative  to  x~ restricted by  (7.1).  Relative  to  this,  Debreu  makes 
1 
the 
Remark:  Suppose  that  for  every  i  E 8  there  exists  an  x~ satisfying  (7.1)  with 
1 
v*(x~)  <  v*(x~).  Then  x*  solves 
1  1  i 
Problem  (2): 
subject  to 




v*(x.)  ~  v*(x~) 
1  1 -40-
(7.1)  W(x.,j)  ~ W(x~,j) 
~  J  v  j  + i. 
Proof:  Again  the  proof  follows  Debreu  [1954].  See  Prescott  and  Townsend  [1979] 
for  details. 
Thus,  under  the  conditions  of  the  Remark,  20/  an  optimum  [(x~),y*]  can 
~ 
be  supported as  a  kind  of competitive equilibrium,  relative to  a  price  system 
v*.  But  note  first  that  the  problem confronting  each  agent  of  type  i  (problem 
2)  is not  that which  appears  in  the  definition of a  competitive  eqUilibrium, 
even with S replaced by  x~.  In particular constraint  (7.1)  has  been  imposed. 
~ 
Thus,  unlike  the  standard decentralization result,  each  agent  type  i  must  know 
not  only his  own  endowment  and  preferences  (and  prices),  but also  the  prefer-
ences  and  assignment  of other agents.  Second,  no  agent  of  type  i  can be  forced 
to  solve  problem  (2);  on  an  ~ priori basis  each  agent's  type  is  not  known,  yet 
problem  2  is defined  relative  to  the  parameter i.  We  circumvent  these diffi-
culties  by  modifying  the definition of a  competitive  equilibrium to allow  for 
endowment  selection. 
Suppose  in what  follows  that  (x~)  is an  optimal  allocation and  v* is 
~ 
the  price  system in Theorem  2.  Let  each  agent  choose  one  component  of  (x~) 
~ 
as his  endowment,  and  then  maximize  (solve  problem 2).  That  is,  suppose  agent 
type  i  chooses  ~, k +  i  as his  endowment.  Then  under  v* his  problem would  be 
subject  to 
Max  W(x,i) 
xEX 
20/  Recall  from  section 6  the  equilibrium price  system puts  value  zero  on  the 
vector  of probability measures  putting all mass  on  the  zero  element  of  the 
underlying  commodity  space.  So  the  conditions  of  the  remark are  frequently 
satisfied. v* (x)  s;  v* (x*) 
k 
W(x,j)  s;  W(x~,j) 
J 
-41-
v  j  :/:  k. 
",k 
Of  course  any  solution to  this  problem,  say xi'  must  satisfy the constraints. 
In particular,  setting  j  = i. 
"'k  .)  W(x.,~  S;  W(x~,i). 
~  ~ 
That  is,  agent  type  i  can  do  no  better than x* by  "pretending"  to  be  some  type 
i 
k  :/:  i.  Alternatively,  if agent  type  i  chooses  the  endowment  x~, his  problem 
~ 
would  be  problem  2,  and  we  know  x*  solves  that  problem.  It  follows  that x* 
i  i 
is a  maximizing  endowment  choice.  In  summary  the  (allocation-type)  tuple 
(x~,i)  solves 
~ 
Problem 3: 
subject  to 
Max  W(x, i) 
xEX,kE8 
v*(x)  s;  v*(x*) 
k 
W(x,j)  s;  W(x~,j) 
J 
This  gives  us  the  following 
v  j  :/:  k. 
Definition:  A comoetitive  equilibrium with  endowment  selection is a  state 
[(x~),y*J  and  a  price  system v*  such  that 
~ 
(i)  V i,  (x~,i)  solves  problem 3; 
~ (ii)  y*  solves 
(iii) 
Max  v*(y); 
yEY 
~ A(i)x~ = y*  - S. 
i  ~ 
-42-
We  have  thus  shown  that  under  the  conditions  of  the  Remark,  any  optimum  can 
be  supported  as  a  competitive  equilibrium with  endowment  selection. -43-
Appendix 
Section 5  -- Verifying the  conditions  of the  Theorem  (Debreu) 
k  k  As  for  (a.l)  note  that  the  asymptotic  cone  of mX  ,  denoted  A(mX  )  equals 
the  singleton  (O}.  (See  Debreu  [1959]  for  a  definition of the  asymptotic  cone.) 
Thus  (a.l)  follows  immediately.  Also,  any  asymptotic  cone  must  contain zero, 
so  (d.2)  is  immediate.  Condition  (a.2)  may  be  verified directly by  using  the 
definition of Xk  and  taking a  limit of elements  of Xk  for  closure  and  a  convex 
combination  for  convexity. 
For  condition  (b.l),  ~~ is  the attainable consumption  set of any  agent  of 
l. 
type  i,  the set of all consumption allocations x.  for  the agents  of  type  i 
l. 
consistent with  consumption  allocation~ (x.)  for all agents  satisfying the 
l. 
resource  constraints  k  (4.4)-(4.6),  restricted to C  .  Let  ~.  denote  the attainable 
l. 
k  consumption  set when  unrestricted  to  C  .  Now  pick  any  consumption x.  in  2~. 
l.  l.  In 
the unrestricted  economy  x.  is weakly  dominated  under  preferences  (4.3)  by  a  con-
l. 
sumption which  puts  probability one  on  the mean  consumption  under xi'  denoted 
(1) 
This  mean  consumption  E(ci )  is consistent with  (4.4)-(4.6)  since xi  is. 
Now  consider  the  consumption  c.  defined by 
l. 
at  t  a 
cil  t 
CPl 
A(91)E (cn  (CPl»  at  t  =  1,  for all  CPl 
ci2 
=  t  A(CP1)  L  A.  (CP2)E (ci2  (CPl ,CP2» 
CPl  CP2 
at  t  =  2,  for all  CPl'~2' 
The  consumption  c  must  weakly  dominate  under  (3.3)  the  consumption E(c.), 
l. -44-
is consistent also with  (4.4)-(4.6)  and  satisfies the  incentive compatibility 
constraints  (4.1)  and  (4.2)  since it is parameter  independent.  Thus  the  con-
sumption  ci  must  be  in  ~i'  But  then 
C  <  c*  iO  0 
by  the  construction of  c~,  t  = 0,1,2 in condition  (6.4).  So  c* E  Xk  strictly 
dominates  c  which  weakly  dominates  X.' 
~ 
For  (b.2)  one  may  note  that W(x,i)  is linear in X  and  consider  the  limit 
of  convergent  sequences.  For  (b.3)  one  may  take  convex  combinations.  For 
(d.l)  0  E  myk  from  the definition of yk.  For 
~  (  k)  ~k ~  k  ~k  and  0  ~ A mY  ,  and  also  that  ~  ~ X  and  mS 
(c.l)  and  (c.2)  note  that  0  E  myk 
E mXk. -45-
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